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THE PSYCHOLOGICAL NATURE OF RISK 
Suppose for a moment that the New York Port Authority receives a threat of a 
radioactive “dirty bomb” to be detonated on a container ship in the Port of New York.  
Lower Manhattan is evacuated, and most of the other five boroughs’ residents also 
choose to leave. Business grinds to a halt as both consumers and workers take cover.  
Within thirty-six hours, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announces that 
the threat has passed. However, many residents wait several more days before 
returning, while others do not return at all.  Business continues to wane as tourism stalls 
and factories and shops close down. It will be several months before the city fully 
recovers. This illustration demonstrates the importance of perceived risk regarding 
terrorism.  The perception of risk – whether or not risk is actually present – is sufficient 
to cause real and long-term damages. Understanding how specific factors drive the 
perception of risk is essential to understanding how people will respond to threats of 
terrorism. 
There are many benefits to the empirical study of risk perception among the general 
populace. This research provides a better understanding of how risk perception 
influences political attitudes; it provides insight into how risk perception impacts 
various behaviors; it allows the mapping of social processes such as risk amplification 
and attenuation; it informs the development of effective communication and education 
programs; and it is useful for identifying which situational factors contribute to 
perceived risk. Each of these benefits will be discussed in turn, along with an 
examination of previous contributions in this field and explanations of how they inform 
homeland security research and policy. 
The concept of risk is a psychological one. Risk, as opposed to danger, is a socially 
constructed phenomenon.1 Riskiness is based on perception rather than fact, and this 
perception is based on qualitative, not quantitative characteristics of the hazard being 
considered.2 Paul Slovic argues that risks are made up of qualitative attributes like 
voluntariness or probability.  He further posits that no single attribute defines the risk of 
a particular hazard; neither are specific attributes equally influential across different 
hazards.3 Even when the facts and probabilities of a particular hazard are well defined 
and well known, human judgment is required to determine which information is most 
important to defining the risk of that hazard.  A study by Slovic and others found that 
participants’ ratings of risk did not match their own mortality estimates, indicating that 
factors other than death toll must be related to risk decisions.4 Whether a risk is 
considered acceptable is also a matter of priorities and values, which are psychological 
by definition.5 The subjective and perceptual nature of risk makes it an important area 
of study for the psychological sciences. 
Perhaps the best illustration of the subjective nature of risk is the discrepancy 
between expert and lay evaluations of a hazard. When judging the risk of a hazard, 
experts rely much more heavily on mortality estimates and probabilities than do 
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laypersons. Slovic and his associates reported that expert judgments of risk 
corresponded to objective statistical data, whereas layperson judgments did not.6  Slovic 
explained such a discrepancy by concluding that experts view risk as the likelihood of 
actual harm based on mortality estimates, whereas lay perceptions of risk are based on a 
number of qualitative (and subjective) characteristics.7 Some of the characteristics 
linked to lay perceptions of risk include the voluntariness of exposure, the dread 
associated with the hazard, the extent to which the risk can be controlled, the potential 
for catastrophe, the level of uncertainty associated with the hazard, and the perceived 
inequality of risk/benefit distribution.8 It is well-documented that expert and lay 
judgments of risk are different; this difference can be traced to qualitative dimensions of 
risk that are applied to lay judgments, but not to expert judgments. The inconsistency 
between expert and lay judgments of risk demonstrates the psychological nature of risk.  
This inconsistency also creates a debate about the appropriateness of using expert 
evaluations alone for policy decisions. In most cases, government and business policy 
makers rely almost exclusively on quantitative risk assessment to guide policies. In 
many cases the involved public fails to accept such assessment. One example is nuclear 
power generation, which has been largely rejected in this country even though it is both 
safer and cleaner than fossil fuel alternatives. Another example is the decrease of 
property values near toxic waste sites, despite repeated assurances that the materials 
have not and will not impact local residents. Participants in a study conducted by 
Donald MacGregor and Paul Slovic considered the standard cost-benefit analysis used 
by experts to be morally insufficient for evaluating and regulating risk, but acceptable as 
part of a more subjective evaluation process.9 Abraham Wandersman and William 
Hallman agreed that such analysis was insufficient for a number of reasons. First, 
quantitative risk assessments are based on a number of assumptions that introduce 
uncertainty into the process; second, the credibility of the risk assessors may be suspect; 
and third, expert assessment often fails to consider issues that are important to the 
public interest.10 The unwillingness of the public to accept expert risk assessment is a 
further demonstration of the psychological nature of risk.  
In summary, the concept of risk is socially constructed and psychologically oriented.  
Comparisons of expert and lay judgments of risk illustrate that public assessments of 
risk are tied to qualitative, rather than quantitative, characteristics of a hazard. The 
relative importance of these qualitative characteristics varies across people or across 
hazards. Risk perception research techniques can identify which characteristics are 
important and when. The question of using only expert judgments for policy decisions 
involving risk is especially salient in the area of terrorism. The Department of Homeland 
Security is engaged in various projects designed to objectively assess risk.  Whether such 
assessments will be adequate to provide public support for policy decisions is far from 
certain.  
By itself, keeping people safe is not sufficient: they must also feel safe. The 
importance of this point in implementing homeland security and emergency 
preparedness programs is difficult to overstate. Without a perception of safety, voters 
will locate and authorize new leaders (both local and federal) who share their priorities, 
and will implement a more “acceptable” security policy.  Such a potential action is not 
just a political threat; it can have a serious negative impact on legitimate programs that 
are effectively reducing risk, and divert money to programs that increase the feeling of 
safety without increasing actual safety.  The answer, from the standpoint of authorities 
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attempting to minimize risk and maximize recovery, is to find a middle ground between 
measures that reduce objective risk and measures that reduce perceived risk. Risk 
perception research can inform policy makers on how to balance objective assessments 
with public opinion regarding security priorities. 
 
BENEFITS OF RISK PERCEPTION RESEARCH 
Slovic uses the Ford Pinto as a case study to illustrate the value of understanding risk 
perception. After producing and selling the Pinto, Ford discovered that a defect in the 
fuel tank could cause the car to catch fire. Ford did a cost-benefit analysis and concluded 
that a recall would be too expensive. If Ford had considered perceived risk in the 
analysis they might have made a different decision.11 Declining to fix the problem via a 
recall resulted in a public relations nightmare that cost Ford much more than a recall 
would have.  Even though the actual fires did not create a significant economic problem, 
the perception that Ford’s product might catch fire did. The mere perception of a threat 
was enough to cause severe problems. The same holds true for terrorism. If a terrorist 
organization provided a credible threat that a nuclear bomb would detonate in New 
York Harbor, the resulting evacuation and general atmosphere of the city would cripple 
the state and perhaps the national economy, independent of whether the danger was 
real. Understanding risk perceptions and responses to risk is vital to understanding – 
and ultimately affecting – public responses to terrorism. 
 
Risk Perception and Political Attitudes 
The study of risk is important in several ways. The first benefit to studying risk is that it 
allows psychologists to better understand political attitudes. Perceptions of risk drive 
public priorities.12 As in the case of the Pinto, or nuclear energy, or airline security, the 
perception of risk – rather than actual danger – drives public demands for action. This 
phenomenon is demonstrated in cases of environmental hazards. Public perceptions of 
risk seriously affect management and regulatory organizations’ budgets, agendas, and 
priorities.13 For policymakers, especially elected policymakers, the psychological impact 
of environmental hazards is just as important as the physical impacts.14 Thus, 
perceptions of risk are an important component of political attitudes. 
Brian Gerber and Grant Neeley studied how perceived risk of routine hazards was 
related to attitudes about government regulation. They found that increased perceived 
risk of a hazard was positively related to support for regulation of that hazard, even 
when the cost of such regulation was stated to be significant. Two other variables 
affected this relationship: issue awareness and trust in the regulators. If respondents 
considered themselves to be ill-informed on an issue, there was no relationship between 
perceived risk and support for regulation. Trust moderated the relationship between 
perceived risk and support for regulation; if the respondents did not trust the regulators, 
then they were less likely to support regulation, even if perceived risk was high.15  These 
results also apply to terrorism. Leonie Huddy and associates found that levels of 
perceived risk were linked to willingness to support aggressive anti-terrorist policies.16 
Studying which features of a terrorist hazard affect perceptions of risk allows 
policymakers to understand which terrorist hazards are likely to become important to 
the public and why. In our democratic society understanding public priorities is 
essential to developing a politically acceptable action plan. 
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Risk Perception and Behaviors 
The second benefit of studying risk is that researchers can understand how perception of 
risk impacts behaviors.17 Along with Ellen Cohn, the author has documented that 
perceived risk of terrorism was positively related to adaptive behaviors such as having 
an emergency supply kit.18 Similar studies have found this relationship to hold true for 
fear and perceived risk of crime as well.19 J. Sherwood Williams and others, in a study of 
urban adolescents, found that fear of crime was an important predictor of defensive 
behaviors such as going out in groups, learning self-defense, carrying spray, or carrying 
a safety whistle.20 Paul Lavrakas compared suburban and urban dwellers and found that 
urban dwellers, who had a higher fear of crime, restricted their behavior more than the 
subjects living in the suburbs.21 David McDowell found a positive link between fear of 
crime and gun ownership.22  Gustavo Mesch found that an increase in perceived risk was 
indicative of a decrease in nighttime activities.23 The behavioral effects of perceived risk 
and fear of crime are well documented, though the research has not differentiated 
behavioral changes related to fear from those related to perceived risk. Numerous 
behavioral changes were also observed after 9/11, though it is unclear which of these 
changes were caused by perceived risk.24 Identifying the extent to which perceived risk 
changes behaviors is an important goal of risk researchers. 
 
Risk Amplification and Attenuation 
The third benefit to studying risk is that it can clarify the conditions under which 
perceptions of risk either increase or decrease. Risk researchers have developed a 
descriptive mechanism known as risk amplification. Risk amplification is concerned 
with factors, both personal and social, that create either a heightened or lowered sense 
of risk within a society.25 Risk amplification ties reactions to socio-economic processes 
as well as event characteristics.26 This framework considers issues such as the stigma 
associated with a hazard, assignment of blame, and the social dynamics within a society 
in order to understand why a risk might become over- or under-estimated.27  
Understanding the complex interplay between perceptions of risk and social processes is 
an important contribution of risk research, and can inform communication and policy 
decisions regarding risk.  
The social amplification of risk framework can be a useful tool for tracing the social 
evolution of attitudes toward terrorism. Consider that several major terrorist attacks 
occurred that involved U.S. citizens before 9/11, such as the two previous World Trade 
Center bombings, the Oklahoma City Bombing, the Marine barracks bombing in 
Lebanon, and the dual U.S. Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. Counter-
terrorism did not become a national priority, however, until after 9/11. While the 
damage of the 9/11 attacks is one variable, the risk amplification framework provides a 
mechanism for understanding what other social factors were involved in alternately 
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Risk Perception and Communication  
The fourth benefit of studying risk is that an understanding of risk perceptions is vital to 
developing proper communication and education strategies.28 It is important for 
decision makers and enforcement officials to be able to explain any hazard and the 
related course of action to the public. Educational initiatives must also build an accurate 
and useful public awareness base. Neither of these goals can be accomplished unless 
communicators understand how risk is defined and perceived by the public. In the case 
of terrorism, communication is particularly important because any major warning must 
be accompanied by instructions, and those instructions must be heeded by the public at 
large. 
Several factors are known to impact risk perception. The first and most important is 
trust, which has been repeatedly linked to perceived risk. Margaret Heldring identified 
credibility as the first requirement for effective risk communication.29 Trust in 
information source was found to impact perceived risk of environmental health 
hazards.30 In a study that manipulated various features of communication of risk, the 
manipulations were not as important as issues of trust in government and authority.31   
Trust seems to be more important when communicating hazards about which the 
perceiver has little knowledge.32 Any communication or education initiative that lacks 
credibility will have minimal effect on perceptions of risk. It is vital that agencies and 
persons responsible for communicating terrorism information to the public maintain 
this trust, or any directions concerning evacuation, sheltering, et cetera, stand a fair 
chance of being ignored by the public. 
Lennart Sjöberg suggested that the issue of trust may explain why lay person risk 
perceptions seem irrational to experts; if the experts themselves lack credibility, then 
disbelieving their assurances is the only rational response.33 Slovic addresses systemic 
influences that destroy trust. These influences are noticeably present in the arena of 
terrorism. One, failures are more noticeable than successes. This is especially true for 
the war on terror, where most successes cannot be identified or publicized because such 
information might compromise intelligence sources. Two, failures are given greater 
weight than successes, even if salience is equal. With regards to terrorism, the costs of 
failure are much more noticeable than are the benefits of success, because success 
merely preserves the status quo. Three, once an audience loses trust, it screens future 
perceptions. Failures become even more noticeable, because people tend to retain 
information consistent with their attitudes.34 Julie Barnett and Glynis Breakwell use the 
1995 contraceptive pill scare in England to illustrate how contradictory expert testimony 
erodes credibility and inflates risk.35 Due in part to the 24-hour news cycle, the 
American public is treated to constant contradictory “expert” testimony. While trust is 
an extremely important variable in risk communication, it is also a very fragile one. 
Specificity is another communication factor that impacts perceptions of risk. Risk 
communications that are not specific are more likely to increase anxiety without 
increasing awareness.36 One example of the importance of specificity in terrorism 
communication is the color-coded alert system used by the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS). For law enforcement officials, this alert system is marginally useful, if 
each level of alert is accompanied by specific actions and procedures. Such procedures 
are developed at the local level, however, so the DHS system by itself is only useful if the 
local jurisdictions have attached their own set of specifics. More useful to local 
authorities is information received through law enforcement channels such as Law 
JENKIN, RISK PERCEPTION AND TERRORISM                                                                                                                                                                              6 
                       HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOL. II, NO. 2 (JULY 2006) http://www.hsaj.org 
 
 
Enforcement Online or the FBI’s Joint Terrorist Task Force gateway; this information is 
more useful precisely because it is more specific. For the general public, the DHS color-
coded system is rightfully criticized for being counterproductive, precisely because it 
offers no useful information to a public audience.  
Heldring outlined criteria for risk communication to be considered useful: credibility, 
specific information about the risk, specific information about what is being done by 
authorities, specific information about what the audience should do, and empathy.37  In 
the case of terrorist warnings, unfortunately, such specific information is usually 
unavailable, or cannot be shared with the public. But risk research provides insight into 
how terrorist warnings should ideally be constructed and relayed. 
Barnett and Breakwell postulated a mechanism by which past risk communications 
influence the response to further risk communications. The series of previous hazard 
notifications (a hazard sequence) impacts the way a hazard is normalized; this 
normalization results in a hazard template – a social heuristic that speeds the 
processing of information related to the hazard. The hazard template is the public’s 
conception of the hazard and includes such characteristics as the organizations 
responsible, potential victims, causes, and consequences; this template provides a 
common ground for interpersonal communication about the hazard. Barnett and 
Breakwell conclude that in order to understand how people will react to a future risk 
communication, we must first understand how previous communications have shaped 
the audience’s hazard template.38 Because so much of the average person’s experience 
with terrorism is from media messages, it would be useful to examine how these 
messages have constructed the hazard template of “terrorism” and how this template 
filters new messages. 
 
Situational Factors  
A fifth benefit to studying risk is to identify situational factors that influence risk 
perception. Psychological research has identified four situational factors that influence 
how people judge risk: expected loss, catastrophic potential, other qualitative 
characteristics (these will be discussed in greater detail below), and beliefs about 
cause.39 Risk perception research provides insight into which event or situational 
features will be most important for particular hazards. In the case of terrorism, such 
information assists researchers or public officials – given specific information about the 
characteristics of a terrorist threat – to predict how people might react to that threat. 
 
Personal Factors  
Several intra-personal factors have been linked to risk perception. In the health 
psychology literature, three factors have been associated with risk perception: 
demographics, socio-psychological variables (like those discussed previously regarding 
responses to terrorism), and structural variables such as experience with the hazard or 
depth of knowledge.40 Sjoberg postulates that certain individuals may demonstrate a 
greater sensitivity to risk, and this possibility deserves empirical analysis.41  
Slovic linked risk judgments to gender (women judge risk to be higher), race, 
(minorities judge risk as higher), political worldview, personal affiliations, emotional 
affect, and trust (as outlined above). Upon closer inspection, however, it appears that 
race and gender differences in perceived risk can be tied to the “white male effect.”   
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About one-third of white men have much lower risk judgments than everyone else, 
regardless of gender or race; when these responders are excluded from analyses, race 
and gender differences become non-significant. Examining these low-risk respondents 
reveals that they tend to be well-educated, have high socioeconomic status, conservative 
political orientation, and higher trust in authority.42 The white male effect may provide a 
link to other personal factors that influence risk perceptions. Fortunately, intra-personal 
variables is one area in which terrorism attitude researchers have acquired a great deal 
of useful information; as previously discussed, however, most of the research failed to 
differentiate between reactions to past events and reactions to potential events. The risk 
literature provides the empirical background to devise and test specific hypotheses 
regarding potential terrorism and personal variables. 
In sum, studying risk perception is beneficial in many ways. It provides insight into 
how risk perception is related to attitudes and lifestyles. It provides a framework for 
understanding how risk is amplified or attenuated across a culture. It allows for the 
proper development of effective communication and education strategies and it provides 
an understanding of situational and personal factors associated with risk perception. 
The natural inclination of the individual is to reduce risk. It is an important contribution 
of psychology to provide empirical analysis of how and why risk is perceived, and what 
consequences are associated with risk perception. 
 
THE PSYCHOMETRIC PARADIGM 
The psychometric paradigm was developed as the research paradigm that logically 
follows the assumption that risk is psychologically determined. The primary assumption 
of the psychometric paradigm is that risk is inherently subjective.43 Recall the 
importance of qualitative hazard characteristics to lay perceptions of risk. The 
psychometric paradigm is based on techniques that collect and analyze subjective rating 
of these qualitative characteristics, including both global (e.g. riskiness, etc.) and 
dimensional (e.g. controllability, familiarity, etc.) evaluations of particular hazards.44  
These subjective ratings then form a sort of personality profile for each hazard being 
studied. It is this pattern of qualitative ratings that affect perceptions of risk. 
Psychometric studies have discovered five factors that generally account for risk 
perceptions: qualitative features of the hazard, benefits of the hazard, annual mortality 
rates, catastrophic mortality potential, and relative mortality seriousness.45 For the 
purposes of the proposed studies, the factor of greatest interest is the qualitative 
features, or personality profile, of the hazard itself. An understanding of how these 
qualitative ratings impact perceptions of risk is a vital step in understanding attitudes 
toward terrorism. 
 
Dimensions and Factors of Risk  
Psychometric studies have studied numerous dimensions of risk for scores of hazards.  
Dimensions commonly used are listed in Table 1. Obviously, so many dimensions can 
lead to very cumbersome research designs, so most risk studies include the dimensions 
most applicable to the study at hand. For example, a terrorism study may elect to 
exclude inequitability, because the inequity of terrorism risk is not likely to be an issue 
as it might be for the risks of a toxic waste dump or nuclear power plant.  
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Qualitative Dimensions of Risk Used in the Psychometric Paradigm46 
 
Voluntariness The extent to which exposure to the hazard is voluntary. 
Immediacy The extent to which the consequences are noticed 
immediately. 
Knowledge of exposure The extent to which a person knows if he has been 
exposed. 
Expert knowledge The extent to which experts know about the hazard. 
Controllability* The extent to which a victim can control the severity of 
consequences due to exposure. 
Novelty The extent to which the hazard is new to society. 
Catastrophic potential* How many fatalities occur at once. 
Dread* The extent to which the effects of exposure are dreaded. 
Severity* The extent to which the consequences of exposure are 
severe. 
Delayed The extent to which the consequences of exposure are 
delayed. 
Certainly fatal* The extent to which exposure will definitely cause 
fatality. 
Increasing* The extent to which the risk is increasing over time. 
Preventability* The extent to which the hazard is preventable. 
Inequitable* The extent to which risks and benefits are not equally 
distributed across society. 
Affects future generations* The extent to which the hazard will affect future 
generations.  
Global catastrophe* The extent to which the hazard threatens a global 
catastrophe. 
Easily reduced* The extent to which risk associated with the hazard can 
be easily reduced. 
Personal impact* The extent to which the risk affects the respondent 
personally. 
Observability The extent to which the effects of exposure are 
observable. 
Dimensions marked with an asterisk (*) were directly correlated with perceptions of risk.47 
 
Risk studies have also sought to reduce the number of analyses by reducing these 
qualitative dimensions into factors via factor analysis. This approach has been very 
successful and has lead to robust research findings. Two factors have been consistently 
(though not exclusively) identified: dread risk, which is associated with lack of control, 
dreaded consequences, catastrophic potential, inequitable distribution, increasing risk, 
and fatal consequences; and unknown risk, which is associated with unobservability, 
novelty, unknown exposure, unknown to science, and delayed consequences.48 Two 
other factors have also been identified in individual studies: number of people exposed 
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and severity of consequences.49 The most consistent finding, however, is that the dread 
risk factor has been the best predictor of the overall perceived risk of a hazard.50   
Identifying the importance of dread and its impact on perceptions of risk is a valuable 
contribution of risk research in general and the psychometric paradigm in particular. 
The identification of two primary factors that qualitatively described hazards has 
allowed risk researchers to map out a number of hazards in two-factor space. Such 
taxonomy is useful for two purposes. The first value is that it explains differences in risk 
perceptions across hazards. In fact, the perceived risk of a hazard is related to its 
position in the two-factor space. The second value is that it explains discrepancies 
between lay and expert estimates of risk. While lay perceptions of risk are consistently 
tied to dread risk, expert ratings are not.51  
One risk judgment that merits special attention is signal value. An event is high in 
signal value if its occurrence changes the perceived probability of future occurrences.52   
For example, 9/11 was extremely high in signal value because it was taken as evidence 
that such attacks were more likely than before to occur again. In contrast, a suicide 
bomber on a bus in Tel Aviv has a low signal value, because this occurrence does not 
alter perceptions of how likely it is to occur again. Along with overall perceived risk, 
signal value has been linked to the position of hazards within a two-factor space.53 
Differences in signal value appear to account for differences in ratings of worry, need for 
awareness, and need for preventative efforts.54 Signal value is also related to how well 
known a hazard is; new hazards tend to be higher in signal value. Signal value may be an 
important political consideration as well, because a hazard with high signal value is 
particularly open to risk amplification processes.55 Barnett and Breakwell suggest that 
novel information is key to intensifying perceived risk, while confirmatory information 
has little impact on risk perception.56 Signal value is an important variable in risk 
perception. Given the extremely high signal value of 9/11, this concept should be an 
important consideration in any study of attitudes toward terrorism. 
In sum, the psychometric paradigm is a research methodology derived from the 
assumption that risk is subjective and that qualitative features of hazards will be linked 
to perceptions of risk. Numerous qualitative features (dimensions) have been studied; 
some are consistently related to risk and some are not. One of the most relevant features 
to terrorism hazards is signal value. These dimensions can also be reduced to underlying 
factors – dread and unknown risk. These two factors allow the hazards to be mapped on 
a Cartesian plane. The location of each hazard is useful for understanding how it is 
perceived. This paradigm provides a promising set of techniques with which to better 
understand attitudes toward terrorism. Researchers may be able to develop “personality 
profiles” for different attacks, profiles which in turn could lead to the creation of a 
taxonomy of terrorism based on subjective evaluations. 
 
The Psychometric Paradigm and Specific Hazards  
While most psychometric studies have examined many different hazards, the paradigm 
can be adapted to accommodate an in-depth study of one hazard. Single hazard domains 
have been studied using the psychometric paradigm, and they too can be represented in 
two-factor space, where position is predictive of perceived risk.57 Slovic examined 
attitudes toward unwanted land uses and also provided several examples of hazards that 
have been studied using psychometric techniques to specific hazards, such as 
automobile structural defect, railroad accidents, and automobile subsystem failures.58 
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While in these studies risk dimensions were reducible into factors, the factors did not 
always match those found in multiple-hazard studies; for example, the factors observed 
for automobile subsystem defects were “foreseeable” and “severe, uncontrollable 
damage.”59 Given the nature of the hazard, these factors are more logical than dread risk 
and unknown risk, the factors discussed above. The psychometric paradigm has also 
been successfully applied to single hazards, but Slovic cautions against representing 
complex events as a single homogenous data point.60 While terrorism has been included 
as a single hazard in past psychometric studies, the complexity and relevance of 
terrorism in today’s society merits an empirical exploration of terrorism as the entire 
hazard space. 
 
APPLICATION TO HOMELAND SECURITY/EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS 
Based on the principles outlined above, several recommendations can be made for those 
directly involved in homeland security, emergency preparedness, and disaster recovery. 
These recommendations are purposely general, because the specifics of how to 
implement them will vary from one context to another. This list is not intended to be 
exhaustive; surely other recommendations can be made, again based on a specific 
context. The following do provide, however, a framework within which to apply the 
research cited here. 
First, it is essential for an organization to build trust with its audience/constituents.  
Without trust, any information from that organization will likely be discounted, 
including information about levels of safety, disaster scenarios, or evacuation 
procedures. One important aspect of gaining and/or maintaining trust is to make the 
successes of an organization as visible as possible. This task is more difficult than it 
sounds, because the failures of any organization are generally more apparent and 
noticeable than are its successes. In some cases, particularly with intelligence 
organizations, successes cannot be shared with the public because such information may 
compromise future efforts. But it is essential that agencies involved with homeland 
security have proactive campaigns designed to build trust with the public by actively 
communicating information favorable to the agency.  Agencies can also build trust in the 
way that they deal with failures. Open communication about the cause of a failure, and 
steps being taken to prevent another, can and should be used to rebuild trust after an 
agency fails to meet its responsibilities.  
A psychological phenomenon that naturally inhibits trust is hindsight bias, or the “I-
knew-it-all-along” phenomenon. Once an event has occurred, observers tend to 
overestimate the predictability of the event. This phenomenon means that failures are 
not only more noticeable, they are considered to be inexcusable, especially failures of 
foresight. From the public’s perspective, any catastrophe or disaster could have been 
avoided, because there was sufficient evidence beforehand that it was going to occur. 
From an agency’s perspective, the evidence predicting an event was buried within the 
evidence against the event occurring, and thus no foresight was possible. Agencies, and 
especially their press liaisons, must be aware of this difference in perspective and be 
ready to publicly account for it. 
Second, agencies must offer specific information whenever possible. This point is 
particularly salient for organizations tasked with motivating people to take action.  
People tend to ignore general instructions that do not include specific actions. Of course, 
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the actions requested must also be sensible to the public, or even specifics will be 
ignored. Therefore agencies must not only provide specific instructions, but give 
detailed (and simple) explanations for those instructions. Specific information is also 
needed for warnings. As discussed above, the color-coded system is largely useless to the 
general population because of its lack of specificity. If details cannot be given, the 
agency must consider whether releasing general instructions or warnings will actually 
cause harm to their communication efforts, either through creating distrust among the 
public, or through desensitizing their audience to such communication. In some cases, it 
may actually be advisable to present no information rather than to present information 
that the audience cannot use. 
Third, organizations must understand the public’s priorities. In cases of general 
homeland security or emergency preparedness issues, public opinion polls can offer a 
basic level of insight. In more specific cases, some level of primary research may need to 
be conducted in order to identify priorities. Once an organization can understand the 
perspective (and thus the priorities) of its constituents, they are better prepared to 
address those priorities. Often an agency is already addressing these priorities, and it 
simply needs to do a better job of communicating these efforts to the public. In other 
cases the public priorities may need to be altered; this is a very difficult thing to do, but 
it is possible if the issues of trust and specificity have already been addressed. If an 
agency does find it necessary to conduct a campaign to alter the public priorities, 
awareness of public opinion will inform decision makers of the progress of such a 
campaign. 
Fourth, the qualitative dimensions (and responses to them) discussed above should 
be incorporated into scenario development exercises. Scenario development may be 
more accurate if the subjective features of a threat are included along with the objective 
features. Of course, the impact of these subjective features is still a matter of ongoing 
research, especially in the area of terrorism, so such a process would necessarily be 
iterative. Once this information is added to our current knowledge and accounted for in 




The study of attitudes toward terrorism is a vital psychological endeavor in the post-9/11 
world. Fortunately, much work has been done and the resulting literature provides a 
great deal of insight into how people respond to terrorism and other threats of 
violence.61 Unfortunately, most of the empirical work has focused on responses to past 
terrorist incidents and has looked mainly at personal factors that are related to such 
responses.62 Because each terrorist attack evokes anger and resolve, however, terrorists 
primarily achieve their goal of fear and intimidation through the threat of future attacks 
rather than the occurrence of previous ones. From a psychological perspective, the 
terrorism that has not yet happened is as important as the terrorism that just happened. 
Terrorism’s future-orientation highlights the importance of understanding how 
people respond to threats as well as to actual incidents. The best psychological approach 
to such attitudes is through the field of risk. Risk is based on judgments, and thus is 
psychological in nature. The psychological study of risk provides insight into how people 
view various threats, and therefore informs predictions about how people will react to 
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the threat of terrorism. The psychometric paradigm specifically offers a valuable 
methodology to explore which features of a terrorist incident drive psychological 
perceptions and reactions to that incident.  
Terrorism – more specifically the threat of terrorism – has become a driving cultural 
and political force. Credible threat is the currency of terrorist organizations. An 
organization that cannot threaten and be taken seriously has no power to change 
attitudes and behaviors. Because the power of terrorism comes from such threats, 
controlling risk has taken on national significance, with an entire cabinet-level 
department, as well as local and state-wide partner agencies, devoted to managing (and 
hopefully reducing) risk. These agencies cannot properly reduce risk, though, without 
first understanding how risk is perceived. Because of the United States’ political 
structure, public attitudes toward terrorism occupy a pre-eminent place in establishing 
government priorities. It is essential that psychologists develop empirically-tested 
knowledge about how these attitudes are constructed, how they change across time, and 
how they impact behavior. The literature reviewed here provides essential progress 
toward understanding terrorism attitudes, and outlines a promising framework for 
continuing that progress.  
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